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ABSTRACT 
The objective of this paper is to assess the veer-off risk of an Italian airport that is characterized for having near 
12,000 annual movements. The name of this airport is not disclosed for security purposes. The methodology used followed 
the principles of probabilistic risk analysis in order to characterize the events and assess the corresponding damages. The 
study used statistical data about accident reports and local conditions that were collected following the standards of the 
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). The methodology used in this work complies with the guidelines for the 
adjustment of lateral runway strips, edited by the Italian Civil Aviation Authority (ENAC). Besides, data available in 
worldwide databases of airplane accidents were also gathered and included as part of the analysis. The method used to 
assess the veer-off risk of the airport is consistent with probability and damage quantification methods published in the 
literature. The main variables considered in the analysis were traffic information, wind conditions, the existence of land-
side buildings adjacent to the runway, and the geotechnical conditions of the subgrade underneath the strip zones. For the 
assessment of the veer-off risk, the authors used primary data provided by the airport management body within the period 
2013-2015 and secondary data available in the literature. The risk of veer-off was calculated in more than 1,500 points 
around the runway. Besides, the authors proposed maximum allowable risks in different locations, and these values were 
compared to the actual risk levels previously computed. The results of this comparison suggested that improvements in the 
soil capacity and/or in the airport management activities might contribute to achieve the proposed allowable risk. The 
results from this assessment showed that the two critical variables determining the risk of veer-off accidents in the airport 
under evaluation were wind conditions and the bearing capacity of the soil underneath the strip areas. Also, it was found 
that the highest veer-off risk level obtained within the Cleared and Graded Area (CGA, part of the runway strip cleared of 
all obstacles and graded) was 2 10-7, while the lowest level was 3 10-8, which are considered typical risk ranges in airport 
operations. In general, the results demonstrate that the adopted methodology is a useful tool to evaluate the veer-off risk of 
a specific airport. Besides, the method allows comparing the actual levels of risk with proposed target levels of safety. 
Consequently, the quantification of the veer-off risk levels offers the airport management body the possibility of 
implementing appropriate measurements in those cases where minimum safety requirements are not achieved. 
 
Keyword: airport, risk assessment, veer-off, strip, probability analysis. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Safety plays a central role in the design and 
operation of infrastructure systems. Thus, any system 
should comply with some pre-specified minimum 
requirements, which are usually defined by codes of 
practice or equipment specifications, in order to guarantee 
an acceptable level of safety. In transportation 
engineering, safety has to be addressed to control the 
potential impact of an accident on the physical elements or 
components of the system and on the users, staff members 
and other people that interact with those components (e.g. 
Cantisani et al., 2012).  
Among the different modes of transportation, 
aviation is considered one of the safest (European 
Aviation Safety Agency, 2016). In fact, existing data 
demonstrate that on-board fatalities in aircrafts with a 
take-off mass above 5.7 Mg have been declining in the last 
decades (Boeing, 2016). Safety in flight operations aims at 
achieving the maximum protection of the people involved 
and at preserving the integrity of the resources involved in 
airport activities. In this context, Safety Management 
Systems are the tools defined by the International Civil 
Aviation Organization, ICAO, to improve safety standards 
in global aviation (ICAO, 2014). For these systems to be 
effective, they should be developed on the basis of risk-
based management principles. Distefano and Leonardi 
(2013), for example, have proposed a risk assessment 
methodology after considering aircraft accidents between 
1980 and 2010. Besides, several other studies reported in 
the literature have presented risk assessment for various 
accident types (e.g., Attaccalite et al., 2012; Ayres et al., 
2013; Feng & Chung, 2013; Loprencipe & Di Mascio, 
2016). The results from these procedures are expected to 
provide accurate data on the actual level of safety of some 
airport-related operations that, if needed, could be used to 
make decisions in order to achieve minimum safety 
requirements. 
In the specific case of veer-off accidents, there 
exist some specific methods to assess the probability and 
risk of these events (Airport Cooperative Research 
Program, 2014; Norwegian Civil Aviation Authority, 
2001). A veer-off is an overrun accident in which the 
aircraft leaves the side of runway, stopping in the lateral 
areas; i.e., Cleared and Graded Area (CGA), runway strips 
or farther (Cardi et al., 2012). Depending on the length of 
the drift and on the structures adjacent to the runway, these 
accidents can have significant consequences. In some 
cases, they compromise both the airport system and the 
nearby airport areas. Veer-offs are produced during take-
off or landing movements due to the misalignment in the 
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header landing or the loss of direction while running on 
the track. The five main factors causing these events are: 
weather conditions, pilot’s behaviour, mechanical 
condition of the aircraft, functional and structural 
characteristics of the airport management system, and 
overall condition of the runway (Di Mascio et al., 2008). 
The type of movement (landing or take-off), the type of 
runway (instrument or non-instrument runway), and the 
type of flights (passenger aviation, cargo, training, military 
or agricultural flights) affect the probability of a veer-off 
event (Moretti et al., in press a). However, existing 
statistical data show that the accident rate of veer-offs for 
general aviation is 10% higher than that for commercial 
aviation. 
In several cases, veer-off accidents cause serious 
mechanical damages to airplanes and significant health 
consequences in the people involved (i.e., passengers, 
crew members, operation staff, etc.). Existing data have 
demonstrated that in around 5% of veer-offs the aircraft 
stopped over the airport boundaries; therefore, the role of 
the strips located next to the runway are critical to control 
these lateral overruns. According to the ICAO Annex 14 
(2013a), the strip aims to “reduce the risk of damage to 
aircraft running off a runway” by means of specific 
requirements of subgrade bearing capacity and 
longitudinal and transversal slope of the CGA and the 
strips. Also, the ICAO regulations state that the CGA 
should be “(…) constructed as to minimize hazards arising 
from differences in load bearing capacity to aeroplanes 
which the runway is intended to serve in the event of an 
aeroplane running off the runway” (ICAO, 2013a). 
Different national aeronautical authorities have 
implemented this requirement by defining a minimum 
value of a bearing capacity index of the soil underneath 
the CGA. For example, ENAC (2008) requires a minimum 
CBR (Californian Bearing Ratio) of 15% for the soil in 
these areas and a subsidence of the airplane gear less than 
15 cm. If these values are not achieved, the agency should 
evaluate the necessity of conducting specific veer-off risk 
assessments (ENAC, 2008). The strength of the soils in the 
CGA and strips areas should be engineered to minimize 
the hazards that could arise from airplanes running off the 
runway but also to allow the access of emergency 
vehicles. Consequently, the bearing capacity of the CGA 
should be designed based on two main criteria: 1) the load 
transmitted by the critical project airplane, which is 
defined as that having the higher Maximum Take-off 
Weight (MTOW), and 2) the heavier aid that could be 
supplied to the fire brigade operating in the airport. Given 
the relevance of this factor, the improvement of the 
geotechnical conditions in these areas constitutes the 
instrument proposed by the Civil Aviation Authority to 
mitigate potential damage and consequences in case of 
veer-off events. 
This paper presents a case study of veer-off risk 
assessment for an Italian airport, which name is not 
disclosed due to security reasons. The study was carried 
out using the methodology proposed by Moretti et al. (in 
press a, in press b) in which available data on the 
probability of veer-offs and average damage levels were 
analysed against specific data of the examined airport. The 
value of applying this technique in the veer-off risk 
assessment of a specific airport, like the one analysed in 
this work, is the possibility of identifying the critical 
factors related to potential accidents. This, in turn, 
provides the information required by the airport 
management body to design a strategy to guarantee a 
minimum safety condition. The methodology adopted by 
the authors allows for an objective assessing of the risk 
level at the airport of interest and the results of the analysis 
are values comparable to a target level of risk to be 
defined during the analysis. 
 
METHODOLOGY 
According to the guidelines published by ENAC 
(2008), the risk analysis of veer-off accidents should 
include the frequency and effects of the events. The 
consequences of veer-offs should consider both 
mechanical damages generated on the aircraft and health 
effects caused on the people involved (i.e., on board or 
outside the aircraft). 
Because these are rare events, the risk analysis 
cannot be limited to the data available for the considered 
airport. Instead, the study requires the combination of 
global data, and specific data related to the geographical 
and morphological features of the runway (RWY). The 
general approach to this risk analysis is empirical, and it is 
based on the analysis and interpretation of events 
described in existing reports. The authors considered over 
3,500 veer-offs, which occurred between 1946 and 2015. 
The data were collected from the following international 
sources: the National Transport Safety Board (NTSB, 
2014), the Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB, 
2015), and the Boeing Company (2013, 2014, 2015, 
2016). 
The analysis of this information has already 
permitted to obtain basic information regarding this type 
of accidents. Moretti et al., for example, found that for 
commercial flights with a MTOW over 30 Mg (ton) the 
frequency of occurrence of a veer-off accident within the 
period 1980-2015 was 1.44 10-7 (Moretti et al., in press a). 
Besides, it has been already stated that this type of 
accidents is more frequent during landing than during 
take-off movements. Indeed, 75 percent of the worldwide 
events occurred during landing (Norwegian Civil Aviation 
Authority, 2001). Finally, it has been also reported that the 
accident rate for general aviation is 10% higher than for 
commercial aviation (National Transportation Safety 
Board, 2016). 
Another important aspect to consider when 
conducting veer-offs risk assessments is the path and final 
location of the aircraft. The final point of the drift path 
leads to determine the lateral probability distribution, 
which is the probability that at the end of a veer-off the 
aircraft travels beyond a certain distance from the 
centreline of the runway. The Norwegian Civil Aviation 
Authority (2001) has found that this probability could be 
defined through an exponential function, such as 
(Equation 1): 
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)()( naxexp                                                                (1) 
 
where p is the probability that the aircraft at the end of the 
veer-off is x meters away from the RWY centreline, while 
a and n are coefficients that depend on the conditions at 
the examined contour. The distance x is calculated with 
respect to centre of gravity of the aircraft. 
For landings on instrument runways, Moretti et 
al. (in press b) showed that the specific equation is 
(Equation 2): 
 
)0219.0( x
landings ep
                                                (2) 
 
Similarly, for take-offs on instrument runways, 
the corresponding equation is (Moretti et al., in press b) 
(Equation 3): 
 
)0143.0( x
offstake ep

                                                 (3) 
 
Equations 2 and 3 will be used in this work to 
describe the lateral probability distribution in a veer-off 
accident in the analysis. This curves allow assessing the 
probability of veer-off according to a statistical approach 
which is not specific to this airport. These probability 
results will be combined with wind conditions and traffic 
information (composition and runway use) to compute the 
actual probability of a veer-off accident in the examined 
airport. 
Regarding the damage quantification method, the 
guidance provided by the Aviation Authority of the United 
Kingdom (Civil Aviation Organization, 2014) was adopted 
to assess the damage level related to this type of accidents. 
Thus, the consequences of a plane crash are associated 
with a numerical value that ranges between 1 and 5, where 
1 corresponds to ‘low severity’ and 5 to ‘high severity’. 
The existence of land-side buildings adjacent to the 
runway and geotechnical conditions of the soil underneath 
the strip areas was considered to quantify the expected 
damage after a veer-off accident around the runway. The 
combination of the veer off probability and the 
corresponding damage in more than 1,500 points around 
the runway was then used to assess the actual risk levels of 
these events and to obtain iso-risk curves. 
 
INPUT INFORMATION FOR THE RISK 
ASSESSMENT 
The airport under study has one instrument 
runway for air operations. This runway (RWY) 36/18 is 
3,000 m by 45 m asphalt paved, and it has one full length 
parallel Taxiway (TWY), which is 24 m wide. The TWY 
provides access to the south and east general aviation 
areas. Two fast exits are available halfway across the 
runway. The strip of the RWY extends laterally to a 
distance of 150 m on each side of the RWY centreline, and 
the CGA extends laterally to a distance of 75 m on each 
side of the RWY centreline. Also, the airport passenger 
terminal is located on the east side of the airfield. Figure-1 
illustrates the general plan of the airport. The specific 
characteristics of the airport, in terms of the wind and 
traffic conditions, the buildings located nearby the runway 
and the characteristics of the runway usage are presented 
next. 
 
  
Figure-1. Airport plan. 
 
Wind 
The Meteorological Aerodrome Reports 
(METAR) for the period 2013-2015 of the airport were 
obtained from the database available on the website 
www.wunderground.com (METAR, 2015). When 
available, hourly information was considered. Overall, a 
total of 26,088 records were collected, each one containing 
the following information: date, time, wind speed and 
wind direction. Since the date of the accidents is known, it 
is possible to calculate the frequency of the wind direction 
in the examined years, as observed in Table-1. In the 
Table, letters N, E, S and W correspond to north, east, 
south and west coordinates, respectively, while n/a means 
that the information was not available. Each combination 
of letters N, E, S and W corresponds to one of the 16 
cardinal directions of the wind rose (e.g., NNE is north-
northeast).
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Table-1. Statistical data of wind direction (2013-2015 period). 
 
Wind direction Heading (°) Number of hourly registrations 
Frequency 
(%) 
variable - 5,002 19 
Calm - 894 3 
N 0 2,697 10 
NNE 22,5 1,744 7 
NE 45 815 3 
ENE 67,5 731 3 
E 90 252 1 
ESE 112,5 213 1 
SE 135 162 1 
SSE 157,5 1,505 6 
S 180 2,054 8 
SSW 202,5 1,030 4 
SW 225 746 3 
WSW 247,5 2,328 9 
W 270 2,385 9 
WNW 292,5 911 3 
NW 315 594 2 
NNW 337,3 2,010 8 
n/a - 12 0 
 
Data in Table-1 show a high wind frequency from 
the western sector. This trend could be easily verified in 
Figure-2 that presents the wind distribution during 
throughout 2015. This information demonstrates that the 
transverse component should be considered since the 
orientation of the runway is 36-18. 
 
  
Figure-2. Wind distribution during 2015. 
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Despite this trend, the intensity of the crosswind 
component is limited: the wind coverage (WiCo), defined 
as the percentage of time that crosswinds are below an 
acceptable velocity, was more than 95% in the airport. 
This means the crosswind component is smaller than the 
maximum crosswind allowable component for the aircrafts 
moving in the airport during 95% of the time. Indeed, both 
ICAO and FAA (2012) standards prohibits the possibility 
of movements when the crosswind component is higher 
than the allowable value defined for the reference field 
length of each airplane (ICAO, 2013), as listed in Table-2. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table-2. Allowable crosswind components (ICAO, 2013). 
 
Allowable crosswind 
component (knots) 
Reference field length 
(m) 
10 < 1,200 
13 1,200 – 1,500 
20 > 1,500 
 
Table-3 lists the collected data for the number of 
crosswind reports that were found to be over the maximum 
allowable levels within the period 2013-2015. The wind 
reports collected by the authors highlight the need for 
considering more years in the meteorological studies 
because the variability of these data. 
 
Table-3. Crosswind reports over ICAO limits (2013-2015 period). 
 
Allowable crosswind 
component (knots) 
Number of crosswind reports over 
the limit 
Percentage of crosswind reports 
over the limit (%) 
 2013 2014 2015 2013 2014 2015 
10 426 555 400 4.9 6.3 4.5 
13 142 247 171 1.6 2.8 1.9 
20 0 11 7 0 0.1 0 
 
For the same period, Table-4 shows the average 
percentages of crosswind reports that were below the 
allowable limit. They are grouped as a function of the 
three wind intensities defined by ICAO and listed in 
Table-2. Meteorological data confirmed the correct 
runway orientation with respect to the existing wind 
conditions. 
 
Table-4. Average crosswind data (2013-2015 period). 
 
Allowable crosswind 
component (knots) WiCo(%) 
10 95.0 
13 97.8 
20 99.9 
 
Data listed in Table-4 show the WiCo of the 
airport complies the ICAO limit, but the asymmetrical 
results graphed in Figure 2 require further consideration of 
the transverse components 270-90 (wind coming from the 
western sector) and 90-270 (wind coming from the eastern 
sector). Table 5 summarizes the wind frequency from the 
western and eastern sectors. Notice that the sum of the 
frequencies of the western and western crosswind sectors 
presented in this table corresponds to the complement of 
the WiCo values reported in Table-4. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table-5. Crosswind frequency for sectors. 
 
Allowable crosswind 
component (knots) 
more than 
Frequency of 
western 
crosswind(%) 
Frequency of 
eastern 
crosswind (%)
10 4.2 0.8 
13 1.8 0.3 
20 0.06 7.6E-03 
 
Table-5 shows that for the same boundary 
conditions, windiness of the site causes higher veer-off 
risk into the eastern side of RWY 36: the frequency of 
western crosswind is much higher (about six times higher) 
than the frequency of the eastern crosswind. Also, the 
analysis of the data show that higher risk conditions exist 
for small airplanes, which have the lowest WiCo values 
and require less than 1,200 m aeroplane reference field 
length. 
 
Traffic composition 
Table-6 lists the annual movements reported at 
the airport during the period 2013-2015. As observed, the 
annual average value is around 12,000. 
 
Table-6. Annual movements at the airport. 
 
Year Number of annual movements 
2013 11,738 
2014 10,988 
2015 13,804 
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In this airport, commercial movements contribute 
to 90% the total number of movements, while general 
aviation contributes to the other 10% of the movements, 
which are non-instrumental. The ten most frequent 
commercial movements for each examined year are 
summarized in Table-7. The codes in this table represent 
specific aircraft models. 
 
Table-7. More frequent airplane models in the airport. 
 
2013 2014 2015 
Airplane 
model 
Number of 
movements 
Percentage 
of 
movements 
(%) 
Airplane 
model 
Number of 
movements
Percentage 
of 
movements 
(%) 
Airplane 
model 
Number of 
movements 
Percentage 
of 
movements 
(%) 
B 737-800 3,272 27.9 B 737-800 3,310 30.1 B 737-800 4,418 32.0 
B 737-700 3,050 26.0 B 737-700 2,562 23.3 B 737-400 3,004 21.8 
B 737-400 2,212 18.8 B 737-400 2,500 22.8 B 737-700 2,428 17.6 
B 737-300 634 5.4 B 737-300 462 4.2 A320 1,010 7.3 
A 320 234 2.0 FK 100 410 3.7 B 737-300 492 3.6 
BAE 182 1.6 A 320 208 1.9 73F 342 2.5 
ATR 42 166 1.4 BAE 114 1.0 FK 100 286 2.1 
F 100 150 1.3 B 737-200 100 0.9 A319 202 1.5 
PA 28 98 0.8 PA 28 72 0.7 B 737-200 152 1.1 
AS 350 94 0.8 MD 82 62 0.6 BAE 132 1.0 
Total 10092 86 Total 9,800 89.2 - 12,466 90.5 
 
For each airplane model, the authors calculated 
the take-off and landing field length. For each of the three 
categories considered in Section 2.1, Table 8 lists the 
frequency of field length requested by all airplanes during 
the period 2013-2015. From these data, it is possible to 
conclude that only 11% of the average mixed traffic 
requires less than 1,200 m of aeroplane reference field 
length and, therefore, almost 90% of the average mixed 
traffic operates with higher WiCo values. 
 
Table-8. Frequency of requested field length. 
 
Requested field 
length (m) Landing (%) 
Take-off 
(%) 
< 1,200 11.36 11.26 
1,200 – 1,500 4.04 0 
> 1,500 84.6 88.75 
 
Runway use 
Runway 18 is used in 90% of the landing events, 
while runway 36 is used in 90% of the total take-offs. 
Assuming that each airplane begins its movement at the 
runway threshold, it is then possible to assess the average 
annual number of movements at different points of the 
runway, after considering that the level of occupancy of 
any RWY is a function of the RWY length required for 
each type of aircraft. 
Figure-3 shows the distribution of the movements 
along the runway. The y-axis represents the distance 
measured on the RWY axis: the coordinate 0 m coincides 
with the RWY threshold 36 and consequently the 
progressive 3,000 m coincides with the RWY threshold 
18. Each point with a,b coordinates of the curves in Figure 
3 show the number (a) of movements (take-off, landings 
or total movements) which occur at the distance (b) from 
the RWY threshold 36. 
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Figure-3. Distribution of the movements along the runway. 
 
As represented by the green triangles in Figure-3, 
central and northern sectors of the RWY 36 had the 
maximum annual number of movements (about 85% of 
the total), whereas the minimum number of movements 
was in the southern sector of the same runway. In the 
latter, the total amount of movements was about half of the 
total annual number of movements (53% of the total). 
 
Buildings located on the side of the airport 
Next to the RWY, there are two main buildings 
with the offices for management operations and air traffic 
control. The first one is located in the western sector of the 
airport and it hosts the control tower and other buildings, 
while the second is located in the eastern sector and it 
hosts land-side facilities and other infrastructure. A land 
base of an adjacent military airport is located on the west 
side, near the control tower but outside the airport 
boundaries. All structures are external to the RWY strip: 
the first one is located the farthest and it interferes with a 
limited portion of the RWY, while the second one lies 
between the point 1,000 m and 2,000 m (Figure-4). The 
most critical building area is along the RWY side in the 
direction where crosswind mainly blows (from western to 
eastern side). The most relevant interference areas in case 
of veer-off accidents are marked in the layout of the 
airport in Figure-4. 
 
  
Figure-4. Potential interference areas in case of a veer-off event. 
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Geotechnical characteristics of the strip areas 
Following the guidelines for the adaptation of 
airport strips, published by ENAC (2005), 12 California 
Bearing Ratio (CBR) tests and 20 plate load tests were 
carried out by the airport management body. 
Higher values of CBR, a quantity that is usually 
expressed in percentage, and of dynamic elastic modulus 
are related with higher mechanical properties of the soil. 
Therefore, these tests allow evaluating the bearing 
capacity of the subgrade. As observed in Table-9, the 
values obtained for both properties are highly variable 
(Table-9). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table-9. Results of CBR and plate load tests. 
 
Maximum CBR (%) 19 
Minimum CBR (%) 1 
Average CBR (%) 5.8 
Standard deviation of CBR (%) 6.91 
Coefficient of variation of CBR (%) 119 
Maximum dynamic elastic modulus (MPa) 44 
Minimum dynamic elastic modulus (MPa) 11 
Average dynamic elastic modulus (MPa) 23.6 
Standard dynamic deviation of elastic 
modulus (MPa) 23.62 
Coefficient of variation of dynamic elastic 
modulus (%) 100 
 
Coloured boxes in Figure-5 illustrate the 
measured soil bearing capacity in terms of both properties 
(i.e., CBR and dynamic elastic modulus or Ed). These 
results show that in most strip areas the CBR values are 
below the minimum 15-20% range required by ENAC. In 
fact, only in northern area of the RWY, the CBR values 
are between the required range of 15 and 20%. However, 
these data have a high variability, as demonstrated in 
Table-9, since a northern point (in the area with higher 
geotechnical characteristics) presents a CBR of 1%. 
 
  
Figure-5. CBR (%) and plate load results. 
 
RISK ASSESSMENT 
The presented specific characteristics of the 
airport under evaluation, in terms of wind, characteristics 
of the runway usage, traffic composition, buildings located 
near the runway and soil bearing capacity, were used to 
assess the risk of veer-offs in this airport. Wind condition, 
runway usage and traffic composition affect the 
probability of an accident, whereas soil bearing capacity 
and the presence of buildings affect the expected damage 
produced by an accident. Consequently, the risk 
assessment requires considering both the probability of 
occurrence of an event and the corresponding damage 
evaluation. 
The models adopted in this analysis permit the 
assessment of veer-off risk at any specific location in the 
Cartesian plane reference system illustrated in Figure-6.
 
 
                                    VOL. 12, NO. 3, FEBRUARY 2017                                                                                                        ISSN 1819-6608 
ARPN Journal of Engineering and Applied Sciences 
©2006-2017 Asian Research Publishing Network (ARPN). All rights reserved. 
 www.arpnjournals.com 
 
                                                                                                                                                 908 
  
Figure-6. Cartesian plane reference system. 
 
According to the model proposed by Moretti et 
al. (in press a), the veer-off probability can be computed 
through the following equations: 
 
xep 0219,0-7101.37                                   (4) 
 
xep 0219,0-71072.9                                   (5) 
 
xep 0143,0-81096.6                                   (6) 
 
xep 0143,0-91082.6                                   (7) 
 
where p is the frequency of an aircraft running beyond a 
certain distance, x, measured from the runway (RWY) 
centreline, according to the Cartesian system presented in 
Figure-6. Eq. 4 is valid for landings on instrument 
runways, Eq. 5 is valid for landings on non-instrument 
runways, Eq. 6 is valid for take-offs from instrument 
runways, and Eq. 7 is valid for take-offs non-instrument 
runways. 
The calculation of the probability of veer-offs at 
specific locations considered the following data: the wind 
condition, the RWY movement lengths, the presence of 
general aviation, and the type of movement. Thus, more 
than 1,500 values of p were calculated; Table-10 lists the 
maximum and minimum p values obtained within the 
runway strip according to the Cartesian system. 
 
Table-10. Probability of a veer-off accident, p, within the strip. 
 
 Distance x from the centerline (m) 
 -150 -120 -100 -85 -75 75 85 100 120 150 
Maximum p 1.3E-08 2.2E-08 3.2E-08 4.1E-08 5.0E-08 5.2E-08 4.3E-08 3.3E-08 2.3E-08 1.4E-08 
Minimum p 1.0E-08 1.9E-08 2.9E-08 4.0E-08 5.0E-08 5.2E-08 4.2E-08 3.1E-08 2.0E-08 1.0E-08 
Average p 1.3E-08 2.2E-08 3.1E-08 4.1E-08 5.0E-08 5.3E-08 4.4E-08 3.3E-08 2.3E-08 1.3E-08 
Standard 
deviation of p 1.3E-09 1.3E-09 1.0E-09 4.6E-10 1.3E-10 1.3E-10 4.9E-10 1.1E-09 1.4E-09 1.4E-09 
Coefficient of 
variation of p 
(%) 
10.00 5.91 3.23 1.12 0.26 0.25 1.11 3.33 6.09 10.77 
 
The method used for assessing veer-off accidents-
related damages is consistent with the method proposed by 
ICAO (2013b). It quantifies the consequences of an 
aircraft accident using a level of damage d varying from 1 
to 5, where high values represent larger damage to both 
human health and aircraft condition (Federal Aviation 
Authority, 2013; Civil Aviation Authority, 2014). 
In compliance with the guidelines proposed by 
ENAC, the authors considered also the geotechnical 
characteristics of the subgrade under the strip area (ENAC, 
2008). The CBR value is listed only for levels of damage 
1, 2 and 3 because, as explained previously, ENAC 
requires the CBR value to be between 15 and 20% within 
the first lateral 75 m of CGA. 
The damage matrix proposed by the authors and 
summarized in Table-11 allows defining a level of risk 
above which the load bearing capacity of CGA should be 
improved, as requested by ENAC (2008). Table-11 is one 
of the most important results and contributions of this risk 
assessment because it combines three types of variables 
and related them to each severity and damage level: 1) 
human health, 2) mechanical consequences and 3) soil 
bearing capacity (expressed through the CBR %). 
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Table-11. Matrix of damage. 
 
Severity Consequences CBR (%) Level of damage, d 
Catastrophic Fatalities - Hull loss - 5 
Hazardous Fatalities or health effects - Major damages to airplane - 4 
Critical Injuries or health effects - Serious damages to airplane CBR < 15 3 
Marginal Slight injuries or health effects - Slight damages to airplane 
15 < CBR <20 within 75 m 
from centreline 2 
Negligible No injury or health effect - Need for airplane revisions 
> 20 within 75 m from 
centreline 1 
 
For each considered location in the analysed area, 
the expected level of damage was defined using statistical 
data of veer-offs around the world during the last 40 years, 
as well as specific conditions of the airport under 
evaluation. For example, the buildings outside the strip 
zone were considered as critical safety elements and the 
CBR values in Figure 5 were selected to estimate the level 
of damage around the RWY. 
According to the presented damage and 
probability models, the risk of a veer-off event (R) can be 
assessed as the product of the probability p and the 
damage level d (Equation 8): 
 
dpR                                                                (8) 
 
As for the probability distribution, expected risk 
levels were calculated for more than 1,500 locations 
around the RWY. Table-12 shows the level of risk within 
the strip zone. 
 
Table-12. R values within the strip. 
 
 Distance x from the centerline (m) 
 -150 -120 -100 -85 -75 75 85 100 120 150 
Maximum R 6.6E-08 1.1E-07 1.1E-07 1.7E-07 1.0E-07 1.1E-07 1.8E-07 1.7E-07 1.2E-07 7.0E-08 
Minimum R 3.1E-08 7.8E-08 7.8E-08 1.2E-07 1.0E-07 1.0E-07 1.3E-07 1.2E-07 8.2E-08 4.4E-08 
Average R 5.0E-08 8.9E-08 1.3E-07 1.3E-07 1.0E-07 1.1E-07 1.6E-07 1.5E-07 1.0E-07 5.7E-08 
Standard 
deviation of R 8.8E-09 8.9E-09 1.3E-08 1.9E-08 2.5E-10 2.6E-10 1.9E-08 1.6E-08 1.4E-08 1.0E-08 
Coefficient of 
variation of R(%) 17.60 10.00 10.00 14.62 0.25 0.24 11.88 10.67 14.00 17.54 
 
The overall statistical results of veer-off risks for 
the evaluated runway are listed in Table-13. The average R 
value is relatively low, but the high standard deviation 
value suggests the importance of conducting further 
investigations on this topic. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table-13. Statistical results of risk distribution. 
 
Maximum R 2.0E-07 
Minimum R 3.1E-08 
Average R 1.2E-07 
Standard deviation of R 3.9E-08 
Coefficient of variation of R 32.5 
 
Iso-risk curves in Figure-7 illustrate the results, 
which are calculated from the RWY centreline until the 
strip boundaries along the RWY. To better present this 
information, the scale of the x-axis in Figure 7 is 1.5 times 
larger than the scale of the y-axis. 
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Figure-7. Iso-risk curves. 
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The high variability observed and plotted in the 
risk levels results from the variability of the factors 
considered as part of the analysis (i.e., wind conditions, 
the field length required by airplanes, and the load bearing 
capacity of the subgrade). The authors used these results to 
propose maximum levels of risk tolerance at the 
boundaries of CGA as a function of the distance from the 
RWY threshold 36. These results are summarized in 
Table-14. The values correspond to the combination of the 
actual probability p of veer-offs and a damage level d 
equal to 1. According to the ENAC guidelines (2008), a 
geotechnical improvement is required to achieve a damage 
level of 1, as explained next. 
 
Table-14. Maximum level of risk tolerable at the 
boundaries of CGA. 
 
Distance from the 
RWY threshold 
36 (m) 
Distance from the centreline 
- 75 m +75 m 
Maximum level of risk tolerable 
0-750 5.03 E-08 5.28 E-08 
751-1,150 5.01 E-08 5.26 E-08 
1,151-3,000 5.00 E-08 5.25 E-08 
 
The actual values obtained from the analysis for 
R values at 75 m from the centreline are higher than the 
proposed limits. Therefore, according to the ENAC 
Guidelines (2008), the load bearing capacity of the 
subgrade should be improved in the CGA area. Geological 
and geotechnical testing is then needed for the design of a 
soil stabilization treatment or a rehabilitation procedure, 
which has the objective of achieving a CBR of at least 
15%. In the areas located more than 75 m away from the 
centreline, but included within the CGA, it is appropriate 
to further evaluate if any action is required, especially 
where d reaches the maximum value of 5 as a result of the 
buildings interference. 
Alternatively, it would be also possible to 
evaluate a better distribution of the movements along the 
runway. The obtained data suggest that a more uniform 
use of the RWY, in which movements start not only from 
the RWY threshold, could reduce the risk in the central 
areas of the RWY. This option is feasible considering to 
the relatively large proportion of small airplanes in the 
traffic distribution of this airport. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
Although existing statistical data shows that the 
rate of airport accidents is decreasing, the International 
Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) continues developing 
initiatives to improve safety performance. Several studies 
available in the literature present methodologies to assess 
the risk of airplane accidents. In the specific case of veer-
off accidents, many national aeronautical authorities 
require specific risk assessments when the minimum value 
of the bearing capacity of the soil composing the CGA is 
low. However, there is not any indication regarding 
allowable levels of risk for these areas. 
This study focused on the implementation of a 
risk-based methodology to evaluate the level of veer-off 
risk in an Italian airport. The work involved the analysis of 
the specific causes that affect the frequency of occurrence 
of a veer-off accident. Weather and operational conditions 
of accidents occurred between 2013 and 2015 years were 
considered as part of the analysis, as well as the 
geotechnical and structural characteristics of the site.  
The probability of veer-off sand veer-offs-related 
damage models were developed as part of the study, and 
they are considered valuable tools to assess specific values 
of risk at different locations within the runway and to 
propose minimum acceptable risk levels. One important 
contribution of this work is the innovative damage model 
proposed by the authors that properly combines and 
integrates human health, mechanical consequences and 
soil bearing capacity.  
The results showed that the current average veer-
off risk of this airport is equal to 1.2 10-7, while the 
statistical analysis suggested that there is high variability 
among results, which is mainly caused by the natural 
variability of the specific conditions of the examined 
airport (i.e., wind distribution, traffic composition, runway 
use and buildings on the land side and geotechnical 
characteristics of soil). The results also showed that the 
maximum level of risk within the strip boundary does not 
meet the allowable level of risk at the CGA boundaries 
that were proposed by the authors. Consequently, it is 
concluded that a geotechnical intervention, as required by 
ENAC, and/or a better distribution of movements along 
the runway could be performed to achieve the proposed 
risk threshold. 
The importance of this study is that it provides 
guidance on how to evaluate specific levels of risk at 
airports through the assessment of the actual levels of risk 
and on specific proposed reference allowable risk values. 
This information provides the data required by 
management bodies and/or authorities to specify 
strategies, procedures of policies to guarantee minimum 
safety levels at airports. 
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